Neorealism and Constructivism in International Relations: A Brief Comparative Analysis of Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, and Alexander Wendt

Last modified on 2009-02-03 20:07:49 GMT. 0 comments. Top.

Kenneth Waltz’ book, Theory of International Politics , published in 1978, is a disappointing effort.  I have never been a proponent, per se, of neorealist perspectives vis-à-vis International Relations, but Waltz, despite his near-messianic stature in the neorealist camp, spends a great many pages saying virtually nothing.  The crux of Waltz’ argument is that in order to construct a meaningful understanding of international politics, the individual state actors, or units, must be completely divorced from the international structure surrounding them, then allowing the structure itself to be analyzed and act as a predictive tool.  He bases his analysis on a fairly traditional realist understanding of international politics, namely the self-help dynamic of states acting perpetually in contest with all others to maximize their own security.  Waltz’ work was amended, in a sense, by Stephen Walt in his 1987 book The Origins of Alliances .  Walt focuses on the dynamics of “balancing” and “bandwagoning” in international politics — the process of aligning with other states against a threat (i.e. The U.K., France, Russia, and the U.S. in the Second World War), and the process of siding with the agressor (i.e. Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia in the Second World War), respectively.  Walt’s work provided a decent framework for understanding the dynamics of the Cold War era, but the system he (or Waltz) imagines has virtually no role in it for non-state actors, a system which, in the post-9/11 era, is fundamentally flawed.  Alexander Wendt’s essay “Anarchy is What States Make of It:  The Social Construction of Power Politics,” published in 1992 in International Organization, contrasts with and criticizes both prior works by articulating, essentially, what has become the constructivist approach to international politics.  Wendt argues that states act based on the nature of their self-identity and the way in which they identify other states.  These identities are formed by the repetition of actions between states.  In a vaccuum, where the state has not come into contact with any other state, Wendt argues that ideas such as national security or strictly defined territorial boundaries do not exist.  Rather, concerns such as national security, and the self-help politics, the realpolitik if you will, that persists in the international arena are not a product of the anarchic nature of the system, nor of a Hobbesean interperetation of human nature.  Conflict between states occurs when states interpret other states a threats, an interpretation built up over time through the interactions between them.  Wendt argues that such conflict is not inevitable, nor is it inherant to the anarchic structure of the international realm, and that states have the power to alter their identities and, as such, their interactions by breaking down their internal identity consensus, critically examining their existing ideas of self and of others and, by extension, their existing structures of interaction, and, finally, alter those structures of interaction by altercasting - which Wendt defines as “a technique of interactor control in which ego uses tactics of self-presentation and stage management in an attempt to frame alter’s definitions of social situations in ways that create the role which ego desires alter to play.”  (Wendt, p. 421)

I found Wendt’s criticism of Waltz’ conceptualization of international structure to be excellent and fascinating. Waltz goes to great lengths to acknowledge that political scientists have relatively little capability to predict action on the international stage, but also suggests that his conceptualization of international structure allows a certain degree of predictability because “similar structures produce similar effects,” (Waltz, p. 88) and because the structure acts as a kind of selector, limiting the avenues open to actors within the system. Wendt quite accurately points out that this structural model functionally can predict virtually nothing. While Waltz is a proponent of the study of individual actors, his structural model alone means nothing without the constituent parts and their myriad distinctions. I found Wendt’s work to act as a kind of “unified theory,” filling in the blank spaces in Wentz’ (and Walt’s) treatment of structure. Waltz seemed to dance close to Wendt’s eventual assertion with his depiction of structure as having arisen spontaneously out of the interactions of states – I would have been much more satisfied with his proposal had he taken the next step and identified the “intersubjective understanding and expectations,… the “distribution of knowledge,” that constitute [states’] conceptions of self and other.” (Wendt p. 396)

I found frustrating Waltz’ absolute demand that the properties of units within the system be completely detached from the conceptualization of the system itself, particularly given his occasionally shaky attempts at disjoining the two. “To define a structure requires ignoring how units relate with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another (how they are arranged or positioned)… How units stand in relation to one another, the way they are arranged or positioned, is not a property of the units. The arrangement of units is a property of the system.” (Waltz p. 80) This statement seems to me to be analogous to a game of four-square. If I take three friends, find a sidewalk, draw four squares in chalk on the ground, and we all take our places in our respective squares, do we find ourselves in the squares because the squares were there or because we drew them with the intention of using them to engage in competition, friendly or otherwise? The nature of the system is entirely dependent upon the nature of the individual units that exist within it if, as Waltz concedes, the system is a spontaneous creation of the units.

Waltz goes on to insist: “Although capabilities are attributes of units, the distribution of capabilities across units is not. The distribution of capabilities is not a unit attribute, but rather a system-wide concept… Variation of structure is introduced, not through differences in the character and function of units, but only through distinctions made among them according to their capabilities.” (Waltz, p. 98) It seems to me that Waltz is forced to exert considerable effort to dance a very fine line around his own rules in order to flesh his proposed structure out to anything beyond a simple statement that there are multiple units and there is also a structure of which they are a part. In this instance, isn’t the distribution of capabilities, or even Walt’s balance of threats, a direct result of the actions that the unit has taken? Those distinctions, even as a function of socially constructed perceptions of threats or capability gaps, exist because of the actions of the unit and, as such, the unique properties of that unit (ideology, defense spending, etc.). Thus, these distributions aren’t a function of the structure actively arranging things to fit together appropriately, but rather the structure passively allowing these changes to take place, which certainly can’t be described as a salient feature of what makes a structure unique and apart from the units within it.

It is my opinion that had Waltz not clung so stubbornly to his rejection of any form of reductionist analysis his book would have been much more cohesive. This is not to say that I don’t appreciate his thorough dismantling of what seem to have been very widespread analytical malpractices in political science research and theorizing, or that his ideas are entirely without merit. I am merely disappointed that he has dedicated so many pages to a somewhat flimsy and skin-and-bones depiction of a systemic theory.

Works Cited:
Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics . McGraw-Hill. New York: 1979.
Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances . Cornell University Press. Ithaca: 1987
Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization , Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992) pp. 391-425

Iran’s Digital Warfare

Last modified on 2008-07-10 18:41:06 GMT. 0 comments. Top.

It seems that in Iran beauty is in the eye of the person on a computer photo shopping the images released by the military’s communications shop. According to the New York Times, everyone was so pumped about the quality of the picture they didn’t notice two identical plumes of smoke, and two identical smoke trails immediately behind the missiles.

Four Missiles:

Or was it three missiles?

Apparently the Iranians felt that a paltry three missiles was only sufficient to get the French worried.

Take Ed or Leave Ed: Iran’s Nuclear Program

Last modified on 2008-07-08 20:54:32 GMT. 1 comment. Top.

It’s the world’s worst-kept secret that Iran would love to have a nuclear weapon. Oddly enough, not everyone is okay with that — the United States and Israel foremost amongst them. Most recently, Iran has rejected the diplomatic push by the United States and others.

The Iranian response was filled with criticism of the way the six world powers — the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China — have conducted the diplomacy.

“The time for negotiating from the condescending position of inequality has come to an end,” the response said, according to the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity under normal diplomatic rules.

The letter added that such treatment “will not remain unnoticed in the eyes of intelligent statesmen.”

So the pressing question is: what does the United States do about it?

Fullosseous Flap keeps it short and sweet:

Negotiations with Iran have gone nowhere. The United States and Israel need to shit or get off the pot.

Allahpundit over at Hot Air says Syria might provide options:

The first question at the first debate between McCain and Obama should be how they’d improve upon the west’s current offer and what lesson they take from the fact that Iran still refuses to even address the substance of the proposal, let alone compromise on the terms. In the meantime, what’s our next move? Trying to turn up the pressure by peeling Syria away? I’m more credulous than usual that Assad might be open to it since Bush and Olmert are both weakened and anxious for a “legacy,” and thus he might think he can get a deal on favorable terms. It may be too that Maliki’s show of spine in Basra plus Israel’s big dress rehearsal in the Mediterranean have convinced him that Iran’s influence inside Iraq is ebbing and that war is on the way, and he doesn’t want to get dragged in on the losing side. Exit question: Would Bush go for it? After the North Korea deal, why not?

I agree that Syria provides an avenue from which to get through to Tehran. To what extent a war against Iran is expected, however, is another issue. The Iranians wouldn’t be saber-rattling and stalling the negotiations so intently if they weren’t confident that U.S. forces were already spread so thin as to make any serious military incursion nearly impossible. What they do need to worry about are the Israelis. According to CNN:

Israel conducted a major aerial military exercise over the eastern Mediterranean Sea this month, a U.S. military official confirmed.

The June 2 exercise was first reported Friday in The New York Times.

The United States believes that the maneuvers were in part an Israeli effort to send a public message that it has the capability to attack Iran’s nuclear program, the official said.

The exercise involved dozens of Israeli warplanes, including F-15s, F-16s and aerial refueling tanker aircraft, the official said. The size and scope of the exercise ensured that the United States and other nations in the region saw it, the official said.

The planes flew several hundred miles into the eastern Mediterranean.

The U.S. military calculates that the distance was roughly the same Israel would have to fly into Iranian airspace if it were attacking Iran’s Natanz enrichment plant, the official said.

So, are the Israelis planning to level a nuclear plant, as they did in Iraq in 1981? Who knows? It would certainly distract from Olmert’s political troubles. On the other hand, the DoD isn’t convinced the Israelis even know where the reactors are. Unless the Pentagon is fooling everybody and an attack is extremely imminent, an attack is not imminent. Am I not wise?

On a very different note, Andy Posner at the Huffington Post seems to have a solution to all these problems. Wind farms. I’m not kidding.

Such an offer would not only have the benefit of reducing carbon emissions and potentially spurring the adoption of renewable energy in oil-producing countries, it would also force Iran to reveal the real reason behind its nuclear program. After all, if Iran is truly seeking more electricity generating capacity, then it should be happy to accept energy in any form; if the offer is rejected, then clearly Iran’s program is not merely for civilian purposes.

A diplomatic coup! What trickery! What cunning! This is the most ridiculous thing I have seen today.

I take that back.

That takes the cake. (Skip ahead about a minute in, to the inspirational story of the elementary school nuclear scientist.)

On a final note, here’s an interesting twist to the whole affair courtesy of Aangirfan:

Britain’s top spy, Alex Allan, the 57-year-old chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, was found covered in blood by an artist, Dominique Salm, 35, who worked in his house.

To avoid any confusion, Allan was found blood-soaked in his apartment by an artist. He was not found in his apartment after having been covered in blood by an artist. Is it coincidence that this follows almost immediately MI6 head Sir John Scarlett’s visit to Mossad to discuss the Iranian situation? Perhaps we have some James Bond stuff boiling up here. It might also be pneumonia. I’m rooting for the Bond scenario, and am working on tying up the movie rights as soon as all of this is declassified.

Take it or leave it.