Much ink has been spilled about the political genius of George W. Bush and Karl Rove. What I am left wondering, with the Bush presidency receding behind us, is how that perception came into being. Carlos Watson summed up in 2004 the general perception of Bush’s political prowess:

Whether you are a Democrat, a Republican or an independent, it is hard not to look at President Bush’s re-election victory [in 2004] and conclude that he is probably one of the three or four most talented politicians of the last half of a century…

Bush’s extraordinary political success is probably owed to at least five key things: (1) great political fundamentals, including an ability and willingness to raise large sums of money; (2) an ability to propose a clear, coherent and easily understandable policy agenda (e.g., “compassionate conservatism”); (3) an ability to attract, manage and retain a strong team of advisers (e.g., Rove, Ken Mehlman, Ed Gillespie, Karen Hughes, Matthew Dowd and others); (4) a willingness to go for the jugular — repeatedly and without remorse (e.g., the “flip-flopper” label, gay marriage issue, South Carolina primary in 2000); and perhaps most important (5) a willingness to take a risk repeatedly (e.g., targeting Democratic Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle for defeat, offering a Social Security overhaul plan proposal, relying and counting on an evangelical turnout plan).

There is a great deal more to politics than winning elections, although that is often how we measure success. In all aspects, however, I cannot help but view the Bush administration largely as a failure. How, then, did this come to pass? How did we go from Rove and Bush as the political masterminds of a Republican ascendancy to a probable Democratic blowout in 2008?

The problem lies in the fundamental assumptions upon which the Bush political apparatus operates. The idea of the perpetual campaign, the installation of campaign adviser Rove in the policy shop, the perpetual eye on the base, the politicization of the federal bureaucracy — these actions were the product of that supposed political genius, but served to not only stave off the stated goal of a “permanent majority” for the Republican Party, but all but guaranteed a Democratic return to power. Nonetheless, the perception was that the Republicans had engineered a near-perfect system. They combined spectacular get-out-the-vote efforts with pinpointed marketing and data analysis for phone banks, mailings, and advertising time, and were brimming with confidence that this plan would put Republicans in the voting booths in sufficient numbers to avert any disaster. In October of 2006, one month before the Republicans’ November disaster, Time had this to say:

The polls keep suggesting that Republicans could be in for a historic drubbing. And their usual advantage–competence on national security–is constantly being challenged by new revelations about bungling in Iraq. But top Republican officials maintain an eerie, Zen-like calm. They insist that the prospects for their congressional candidates in November’s midterms have never been as bad as advertised and are getting better by the day. Those are party operatives and political savants whose job it is to anticipate trouble. But much of the time they seem so placid, you wonder whether they know something.

They do. What they know is that just six days after George W. Bush won re-election in 2004, his political machine launched a sophisticated, expensive and largely unnoticed campaign aimed at maintaining G.O.P. majorities in the House and Senate…

Every Monday, überstrategist Karl Rove and Republican Party officials on Capitol Hill get spreadsheets tallying the numbers of voters registered, volunteers recruited, doors knocked on and phone numbers dialed for 40 House campaigns and a dozen Senate races. Over the next few weeks, the party will begin flying experienced paid and volunteer workers into states for the final push. The Senate Republicans’ campaign committee calls its agents special teams, led by marshals, all in the service of the partywide effort known as the 72-Hour Task Force because its working philosophy initially focused on the final three days before an election.

The 72-Hour Task Force exemplifies the problem of the Bush political machine — running a country is very difficult with one eye focused on the three days before an election. Rove, explains the Top of the Ticket blog at the LA Times, has “long been renowned among co-workers for mining details and all sorts of fascinating tidbits from material that others completely missed.” While Rove certainly does have an eye for details, he misses the big picture in the process. What could possibly go wrong when you run the federal government in such a manner as to maximize the turnout of the Republican base in election years? For one thing, bad policy. What the Bush administration’s political “geniuses” overlooked was the simple fact that most of the American people are not partisan attack dogs. Most voters in this country vote on the basis of whether or not they think the country is being run well. These voters do not define good policy and good results according to a party-line litmus test. This is the ultimate failing of the Bush administration — substituting catch-phrases for government. Is it genius, in a game of chess, to snatch the opposing Queen only to be checkmated on the next move? Pulling out a win is, naturally, a very important part of electoral politics, but it is not the most important part. The most important part of electoral politics is establishing a basis upon which to win the next ten elections. The Rove and Bush never figured that out, and they will face the consequences yet again come November.

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